Information systems ontology is intended to facilitate interoperability among the many applications which are now becoming available on the Internet. In particular, it is intended to facilitate the development of intelligent agents which can automate a large part of the task of a user achieving some end employing multiple autonomous applications. A large number of ontologies exist supporting specific kinds of interoperation among selected, generally mutually aware, applications. The intent of the upper ontology movement is to develop an abstract description of what there is in the world, in an application-independent form, which can be used both to help build specific ontologies and to help in finding common ground among them. This paper argues that, for the purposes of information systems interoperation and the semantic web, application-independent upper ontologies are unlikely to be successful because of semantic heterogeneity. However, the paper argues for a distinction in upper ontologies between formal and material ontologies, based on analogies with concepts in Kant's synthetic a priori, and that formal ontologies whose focus is on how we see the world are more likely to be successfully developed in the absence of applications than are material ontologies, which attempt to catalog the world a priori.
INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of the Internet has made vast numbers of information systems applications widely accessible. This accessibility has led to a movement to develop programs, called agents, which will interoperate with the applications to perform more or less complex tasks on behalf of their owners. Generally these agents exist in communities performing related tasks in a common environment. One kind of such community is an eMarketplace [1] . A more advanced application is the composition of business processes into novel value-added applications [2] . But this sort of activity has a long history, in the world of Electronic Document Interchange, and the US ANSI/NISO Z39.50 information retrieval standards widely used for library services interoperability.
In order for two programs to interoperate, there must be an agreement as to what the words mean, including the types of messages exchanged, the schemas of these messages and the individual objects with which the interoperations are concerned. It is becoming common to call these agreements ontologies. In particular, an ontology is A body of formally represented knowledge is based on a conceptualization: the objects, concepts, and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area of interest and the relationships that hold among them . . . an ontology is an explicit representation of a conceptualization.
[3] p. 1
The engineering problem is how to build an ontology. One way to approach the problem is to match the elements in the data models of the individual applications, forming an ontology from the union of the results. This is essentially the same problem as the federated database problem, which was given its canonical formulation by [4] . The critical constraint in federated database research was that the applications being integrated remain
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Formal versus Material Ontologies for Information Systems 5 autonomous. The idea was to find methods to develop views so that the structural differences among the different database schemes could be resolved without the underlying applications having to change. However, practical federated database projects tended to fail owing to the problem of semantic heterogeneity-different applications mean different things by similar terms. Research in this area died out in the mid-1990s. A summary of the issues involved is in [5] .
Semantic heterogeneity among the agents in a community accounts for the concept, also in [3] of 'committing to the ontology'. The ontology is established before the community can come into existence (the ontology is a global schema in terms of [4] ). Each participant must align their schemas, identification schemes etc. with the ontology, and must agree to behave as the ontology prescribes. Preservation of autonomy is impossible.
Each community of agents is organized around an ontology. There are many such communities and many ontologies. In particular, there are thousands of business-to-business e-commerce exchanges. An organization may participate in many exchanges. Each participation requires commitment to a different ontology. Related exchanges with different ontologies cannot interoperate for the same reason individual applications cannot. Therefore the problem of building ontologies recurs at a more general level.
Building an ontology along the federated database approach can be called a bottom-up method. There is a contemporary approach to the problem which might be called top-down. The concepts of ontology have arisen in philosophy over thousands of years. One definition is
[W]hat we now refer to as philosophical ontology has sought the definitive and exhaustive classification of entities in all spheres of being . . . including the types of relations by which entities are tied together.
[6] p. 2
Instead of designing ontologies for specific applications, why not take [6] above seriously and develop a single universal ontology such that once an application has committed to it, it can then interoperate freely in the wide world. The intent of the contemporary upper ontology movement is to develop a description of what there is in the world, in an applicationindependent form, which can be used both to help build specific ontologies and to help in finding common ground among them. One statement of the goal of ontological research is An ontology for a possible world-a catalog of everything that's in the world, how it's put together, and how it works. [7] , p. 294
One of the upper ontology efforts is the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO), whose goal is that the Standard Upper Ontology (SUO) will provide definitions for generalpurpose terms, and it will act as a foundation for more specific domain ontologies. It is estimated that it will eventually contain between 1000 and 2500 terms and ∼10 definitional statements for each term. The SUO will have a variety of purposes, some of which can be glossed as follows [8] p. 2.
• Design of new knowledge bases and databases. Developers can craft new knowledge and define new data elements in terms of a common ontology, and thereby gain some degree of interoperability with other compliant systems.
• Reuse/integration of legacy databases. Data elements from existing systems can be mapped just once to a common ontology.
• Integration of domain-specific ontologies. Such ontologies (if they are compliant with the SUO) will be able to interoperate (to some degree) by virtue of shared terms and definitions. There are many kinds of uses to which ontologies can be put [9] . The particular kind of use of concern in the present paper is called there 'Run-time interoperation'. The agents do business with each other.
In a real estate conveyancing exchange, the agents are able to search titles for particular properties in the full range of relevant government instrumentalities, verify mortgage and insurance details for specific properties and specific owners, and so on. Run-time interoperation requires that the agents be able to exchange information at the most specific level. This is why the problem of constructing ontologies is very similar to that of federating databases.
A second kind of use of concern in this paper is what [9] call 'Application Generation'. Unlike run-time interoperation where the ontology is extremely specific, in application generation the ontology specifies a general class of object which can be made more specific by the choice of parameters and then imported into an ontology supporting run-time interoperation. Model-Driven Architecture [10] is an approach of this kind. An example of an ontology used for application generation would be a general model of a transaction, including business and database transaction, which would be widely useful in ontologies supporting run-time interoperation.
This paper intends to make two points based on what we take to be claims of the upper ontology movement. There are two, a strong claim and a weak claim.
Strong claim.
Commitment to an upper ontology can solve the problem of semantic heterogeneity in the bottom-up construction of an ontology for run-time interoperation from the data models of the participating agents.
Weak claim. Commitment to an upper ontology will allow development of generic application development ontologies which can be widely usable in ontologies supporting run-time interoperation.
The strong claim is arguably too strong, although there is support for it in the quotation from [8] above. It does not make sense to push the strong claim for SUMO though, since SUMO has only a few thousand concepts, hardly enough to support a wide range of specific run-time interoperations. One might make that claim for another upper ontology, Cyc, which has millions of concepts. (Cyc themselves do not make that claim.)
The weak claim, however, is clearly supported in the quotation. But for the weak claim to be other than the announcement of a system of class libraries, the ontology must consider itself to be a representation of independently existing concepts in the world, as in the quotation from Sowa above. As a consequence, one would expect that different upper ontologies would have a high degree of agreement in their representations of common concepts, in the same sort of way that two different descriptions of a species of biological organism would have a high degree of agreement. One could not argue that semantic heterogeneity had been overcome if a model of say transaction developed in SUMO were not substantially the same of a model of the same concept developed in Cyc. We articulate the underlying hypothesis for the weak claim as Underlying hypothesis. High-level concepts widely usable in run-time interoperation ontologies can be described with sufficient precision using a small number of abstract definitions.
The first point is a counterclaim, that both the strong and weak claims cannot be sustained. It could easily be refuted if the upper ontology proponents could point to a string of successful application of their approaches to ontologies supporting runtime interoperation or at least application generation. But the empirical fact to be explained in this paper is the absence of such successful applications. Of course the absence of success is not in itself a reason to cease persevering. The recent proof of Fermat's theorem shows that.
Sometimes, though, prolonged failure to succeed suggests the possibility that the problem is unsolvable. In the case of the classical geometric problems, one of which is squaring the circle, people persevered for thousands of years until a proof of the impossibility was found. This paper does not claim to prove the impossibility of the usefulness of upper ontologies in overcoming semantic heterogeneity.
However, the medieval search for the philosopher's stone which could turn base metals into gold was given up when a deeper understanding of chemistry and physics undermined the intuitive appeal of the undertaking, without a strict proof of impossibility. What this paper attempts to do is to suggest that we entertain the idea that upper ontologies may not be productive, and consider some arguments which undermine the intuitive appeal of the underlying hypothesis. This is in the same spirit that once a problem has been proved to be NPcomplete, people generally give up looking for a polynomialtime algorithm. That a problem is NP-complete does not mean that a polynomial-time algorithm does not exist, only that the problem in question is linked to so much unsuccessful effort looking for algorithms that success would seem to be unlikely.
Consider an extreme case of run-time interoperation, that of a team sport. There are a number of players who interact with others in a system governed by the rules of the game. The rules of games are good examples of ontologies. One game is cricket. A large number of people all over the world interoperate using the cricket ontology. Another game is baseball. A large number of people, largely in North America, interoperate using the baseball ontology.
Cricket and baseball are closely related games. Both have bats, balls, innings, runs, outs, fielders. Cricket has roles called 'bowler' and 'wicket-keeper' which are closely analogous to the baseball roles 'pitcher' and 'catcher'. One can easily imagine that both sets of rules could be subsumed in a suitable upper ontology. But it is absurd to think of a group of players playing cricket interoperating with a group of players playing baseball. No amount of similarity in more general classes helps. It is even absurd to think of interoperation of players of nearly identical sports such as American and Canadian gridiron, between which there is very little semantic heterogeneity. That little is enough to make interoperation unthinkable.
This example is almost in itself a refutation of the strong claim.
However, we are left with the engineering problem of building the necessary ontologies enabling the networks of run-time interoperation. The second point of this paper is that the weak claim is sometimes sustainable and sometimes not. The argument will be that where the weak claim is made in respect to an ontology which purports to be about the world (a material ontology), it is generally not sustainable, but that if it is made in respect to an ontology which can be seen as a rich knowledge representation system (a formal ontology), it is likely to be sustainable, because they enable the development of reusable software to manage the structure of the relevant objects.
The argument of the paper begins with a discussion of several upper ontologies. It then shows how these ontologies would be expected to fail in application as a result of semantic heterogeneity. Two arguments are presented, one negative: an example of a concept which is fundamentally different in the various systems, and one positive: a discussion about the origins of semantic heterogeneity in agent community problems.
The positive argument relies on a recent contribution to the understanding of the kinds of things represented in information systems, namely John Searle's [11] concepts of the extremely context-dependent institutional fact and of background, the large amount of poorly articulated contextual knowledge which blocks bizarre interpretations of ordinary utterances, supports context and is a major contributor to the pervasiveness of semantic heterogeneity. We will see that it is very unlikely that one could build a useful a priori ontology of institutional facts supporting interoperation and will recognize that nearly all the content of most information systems consists of records of institutional facts.
These two arguments undermine the plausibility of the underlying hypothesis, and so support the counterclaim that attempts to support information systems interoperation by building catalogs of everything, even generic catalogs, are doomed to failure. But the paper continues with an argument
Formal versus Material Ontologies for Information Systems 7 that some of the upper ontology work can plausibly succeed. If we examine the actual upper ontologies being developed, many of them are extremely abstract. [3] argues that for engineering purposes, an ontology is an ontologically homogeneous collection of terms and relationships. Perhaps it makes sense to identify a subclass of term which can function independently of applications, and thus succeed in the face of strong semantic heterogeneity.
Identification of this plausibly successfully applicationindependent subclass of upper ontology relies on the thought of Immanuel Kant, specifically the idea of the synthetic a priori from the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant may be an 'enemy of metaphysics' [6] , but he may turn out to be a friend of information systems upper ontology. We do not argue for Kant's entire view, but take his approach as a way of classifying upper ontologies 'at the joints', as Plato advised in the Phaedrus, in order to obtain a clear distinction which can be used as a basis for discussion. We first look at the synthetic a priori, then see how it can be used to extract the hoped-for subsets of the upper ontologies. It is argued that the resulting subset can be usefully regarded as an enrichment of knowledge representation systems.
The paper concludes with a discussion of some implications and subsidiary arguments, leading to the conclusion that even though one may be pessimistic about the feasibility of the 'theory of everything' upper ontology projects, there is hope for the success of the more limited formal ontology approach for a more limited aim which recognizes the prevalence of semantic heterogeneity.
SAMPLE OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY EFFORTS
This section examines several upper ontology efforts, without intending to be comprehensive. We look at Cyc, SUMO, OntoClean/DOLCE, General Ontological Language (GOL), the Bunge-Wand-Weber (BWW) ontology and the top level of WordNet.
Cyc
Cyc is an enormous system, having been developed over many years. 1 To get some idea of what it looks like, we will look at the structure of a middle-level concept relevant to information systems interoperation, that of transaction, in Figure 1 .
We have included some of the comments which describe the details of the various parts of the concept. The rules implicit in the comments are represented in the system, and can be reasoned with. Cyc is explicitly intended to be a theory of everything.
SUMO
The SUMO project is also intended to be a theory of everything, but at a much more abstract level than Cyc. It is much smaller. However, it goes down to the level of transaction, and a little below ( financial transaction, then buying, selling). The concept is shown in Figure 2 .
Notice that the two definitions of transaction are similarly rich, but different in detail. The SUMO concept includes change of possession, whereas the Cyc concept requires exchange of actions under an agreement. The superclass structure is different in detail, but broadly similar.
OntoClean/DOLCE
OntoClean's top level, called DOLCE [12] is a very much smaller and much more abstract system, the top levels of which are shown in Figure 3 . This ontology does not go down to the level of transaction, but a transaction would be an event. (The supertype occurrence is the only part of the ontology where changes can be modeled.)
GOL
GOL [13] is a structure-oriented very abstract ontology, whose basic concepts are shown in Figure 4 . Interesting things such
The Computer Journal Vol. Process-Intuitively, the class of things that happen rather than endure. A Process is thought of as having temporal parts or stages, and so it cannot have all these parts together at one time (contrast Object). Examples include extended 'events' such as a football match or a race, events and actions of various kinds, states of motion and lifespans of Objects, which occupy the same space and time but are thought of as having stages instead of parts. The formal definition is anything that lasts for a time but is not an Object. Note that a Process may have participants 'inside' it which are Objects, such as the players in a football match. In a 4D ontology, a Process is something whose spatiotemporal extent is thought of as dividing into temporal stages roughly perpendicular to the time-axis.
subclass of Physical
Physical-An entity that has a location in space-time. Note that locations are themselves understood to have a location in space-time. subclass of Entity Entity-The universal class of individuals. This is the root node of the ontology. as transactions are constructed from these components held together with relational moments (a moment is a substance which can exist only in another substance, such as color or a handshake). These complex structures are called situoids, which include situations. Dynamics of situoids are processes, which are resolved into events. So a transaction would be described as a process within a situoid.
BWW
The BWW ontology [14] in its present form comes from the information systems community rather than artificial intelligence. Its key concepts are summarized in Figure 5 .
There are in addition a number of derived concepts expressed as predicates, often on the history of a thing. Some of these predicates (e.g. that one complex object is an input to another) require a concept of causality. 
WordNet
Wordnet [15] is a structured collection of English language terms. Some of the structures are hierarchical, leading to the top level shown in Figure 6 . Although not strictly an ontology, it is widely used and cited in the ontological research community because of its richness of structure, size and availability. A
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SEMANTIC HETEROGENEITY
Semantic heterogeneity is something that often occurs when we have two or more systems of concepts covering the same universe of discourse, when something expressed in one system cannot be exactly expressed in the other. We exclude situations where something simply expressed in one system can be exactly expressed by a set of calculations in the other, what in database systems is called a view. For example, street addresses are expressed differently in New York, Sydney and Venice. In New York, an address is uniquely identified by street and number. In Sydney, street and number are unique only within suburb (of which there are ∼1000). In Venice, addresses are identified by number within district (of which there are ∼10). Streets are irrelevant. Sydney addresses could be represented in a New York-oriented system by say concatenating the suburb name with the street name. For Venice, one way the address could be represented in a New York-oriented system is by treating the district as a street name. Alternatively, if we include the street name in the information we have about the address, we could use the Sydney-oriented system and its conversion to the New York system. Mismatches such as this which can be resolved with views are often called semantic heterogeneity as well. We have elsewhere [5] called this kind of situation resolvable semantic 2 http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/∼wn/online/ heterogeneity as distinguished from fundamental semantic heterogeneity which is the main concern of the present paper.
More generally, and in a somewhat different vein, Eskimos are said to have many words for snow. However, it is fairly likely that possibly complex English locutions could be constructed to get close enough to any one Eskimo word that we would not say that we have encountered fundamental semantic heterogeneity, which in this context would be a concept which can be expressed by the Eskimo but not by an English speaker. So the snow example would be resolvable by what amounts to a view.
Because of the richness and flexibility of natural language, in the world of medium-sized fairly concrete objects favored as examples by most writers in ontology semantic heterogeneity can be hard to see unequivocally.
But information systems are not generally about mediumsized fairly concrete objects. Most of the content of most information systems are records of what [11] calls institutional facts. We will describe the concept of institutional fact and then the related concept of background, showing a number of situations where semantic heterogeneity is present and where it may be absent. Following this, we will argue on a priori grounds that a useful application-independent ontology for systems of institutional fact is unlikely to be possible.
Searle calls concrete physical objects which exist independently of humans brute facts. A brute fact which has significance for a social group in a certain context is called an institutional fact. Searle uses the formula (brute fact) X counts as (institutional fact) Y in context C to organize institutional facts.
Institutional facts are generally the results of speech acts. The quintessential speech act is naming. In many societies a baby gets its name by someone filling in a form (the filled-in form is a brute fact). But satisfaction of contextual rules is necessary for that brute fact to count as giving the baby its name. The person filling in the form must be authorized (generally one of the parents). The form must be handed in to the proper registry office, and must be properly processed by the staff of that office, including the making of a permanent record and the issuing of an authorized copy of the record (birth certificate).
Contemporary society requires a multitude of institutional facts to operate.
In particular, the operation of most organizations consists almost exclusively of the creation of institutional facts. Buying and selling are speech acts, the results of which are institutional facts recording change of ownership. The records of buying and selling are therefore records of institutional facts. The orders given to pack and ship goods are, too. So are the orders given to purchase materials and manufacture goods. Staff being paid, students being enrolled in educational institutions and receiving qualifications, regulations being enacted and enforced, all are speech acts which create institutional facts. Information systems, including websites, are almost exclusively concerned with records of institutional facts.
If it is difficult to see semantic heterogeneity in the world of middle-sized concrete objects, it is difficult to avoid semantic heterogeneity in the world of institutional facts. Anyone who has tried to combine independently compiled statistics, or to place a student from one educational program in the middle of another, or to evaluate complex service quotations, or to convert from one computer system to another, or to change jobs within similar industries, or to be involved in a merger, or to move from one country to another, could provide many examples.
Indeed the surprising thing is when it is possible to interoperate with two systems of institutional facts without semantic heterogeneity. Integrating statistics is hard, but it is easy to compare performance of companies traded on a given stock exchange. The stock exchanges require standardized financial reporting and are able to enforce the standards. Converting from one computer system to another is hard, but it is not too difficult to convert from one web browser to another. Most of what web browsers do is mandated by standards of the World-Wide Web consortium. Evaluating complex service quotations is difficult, but if one company buys a service from another they agree on what that service consists of and what its price is. This agreement is the result of negotiation and is expressed in a contract.
Besides the concept of the complexly context-dependent institutional fact, [11] describes another concept which makes a large contribution to semantic heterogeneity, namely that of background.
The literal meaning of any sentence can only determine its truth conditions or other conditions of satisfaction against a background of capacities, dispositions, know-how, etc., which are not themselves a part of the semantic content of the sentence.
[11] p. 130
Background is a complex topic, consisting in Searle's treatment of many aspects, one of which is 'dramatic category' (p. 134). A dramatic category is our expectation of the behavior of objects in our environment, and of how various kinds of situations are supposed to develop. A simple semantic web type example will both illustrate the concept and its contribution to semantic heterogeneity. Consider the application of on-line search for apartments to rent, which is now fairly common in many cities throughout the world. The advertisements and descriptions of apartments in Brisbane, Australia, are much the same as those in Padua, Italy. Allowing for the difference in language (English versus Italian), and some variation in description (e.g. in Padua, many apartments are heated from a common plant, and therefore the rent is often quoted plus expenses, whereas in subtropical Brisbane, apartments are generally heated if at all by space heaters so the cost of heating is not paid to the owner) the applications are very similar. So much so, that it is not difficult to imagine a software package which could be configured for either city. The two applications could therefore be running very successfully with exactly the same ontologies.
Suppose now someone comes from Brisbane to spend a year in Padua. Being used to the Brisbane application, he is delighted to find the same application running in Padua, and happily searches for an apartment in the right location, price range and of the right type. Finding one, he goes to the agent and receives a nasty shock. Almost no apartments are available for a lease period as short as 1 year-the usual term is 4 years, although some owners will settle for two. In Brisbane, almost all leases are for 6 months. Suppose he does find a landlord willing to give a very short lease, he has another shock when the agent presents a bill for his commission. In Brisbane, the commission to the rental agent is always paid by the owner. In Padua, always by the renter. Nowhere in either ontology is the term of lease or who is liable for the agent's commission mentioned. These are part of the background. Residential leases and estate agents behave differently in the two environments. An automated agent would produce something of a disaster with this problem.
Of course, it would be possible to make any two such systems interoperable by identifying and representing relevant parts of the background, thereby expanding the ontology, but this is a systems development effort needing to be done by humans, not something that an agent supported by an ontology could be expected to accomplish. It could, for example, require changes to business practices. If there came to be a large number of medium-term visitors to Padua sufficient to make it worthwhile to investigate and represent the relevant aspects of the background, then some owners might decide to change their practices to cater to this market.
It might be objected that this very fine-grained heterogeneity is too fine for consideration when building top-level ontologies. However, the problem occurs at any level of granularity. Imagine two applications trying to interoperate with the concept transaction. One application uses the Cyc ontology (Figure 1) , and the other the SUMO ontology (Figure 2) . The SUMO ontology requires that whatever is subsumed by transaction involves a change of possession of something, whereas the Cyc concept does not. However, the Cyc concept requires that there be some agreement under which the agents are cooperating, whereas the SUMO ontology makes no mention of agreements in this context.
Let us look at the concept of transaction as we might encounter it in trying to build applications where information systems interoperate with each other. The term is used in the technology of database management systems to refer to an atomic persistent change of state. We may exclude this meaning on the grounds that things happening within computer systems are not relevant-we want out ontologies to describe the world.
We would pretty clearly want the concept to apply to the interaction with Amazon.com resulting in the placing of an order and the supply of credit card details.
This would be a transaction for Cyc, although it is hard so see where the agreement is, especially if the order originates outside the USA so that there is no overriding institutional context, but not for SUMO, since nothing has changed possession.
To bring it under the SUMO concept, we need to include the subsequent packing and shipping of the order, its receipt by the purchaser in good condition, and the acceptance of the credit card charge by Visa.
Further examples are:
• The interaction with Medline resulting in the placing of a query and the return of a collection of abstracts. Nothing changes possession here, so the SUMO concept is hard to apply, and the case for an agreement is harder to make, which makes it harder to apply the Cyc concept.
• The borrowing and ultimate return of a book by the University of Queensland library from the University of Sydney library (interlibrary loan), on behalf of an academic (who must also borrow and return the book from the University of Queensland library). Here, the agreement is pretty clear, so the Cyc concept applies. However, when the transaction is completed, the whole point is that no change of possession has occurred, so again the SUMO concept is hard to apply.
• Finally, the interaction between the 2002 Salt Lake City
Winter Olympics results processing agent and the agents responsible for the maintenance of results on multiple websites ultimately completing with the information that the medal results for ice hockey have been recorded on all sites.
It is hard to see how the agents are 'performing actions in exchange for the actions of each other', since all the agents do what they are supposed to do when they are triggered, and do not model each other. Especially if all the sites are operated by the same organization, the element of agreement is very hard to argue for. So the case for applicability of the Cyc concept is weak. Also, the SUMO concept is hard to apply, since nothing ever changes possession. However, these examples are quite like each other from a computing point of view. They are all instances of successful interoperation among information systems, where a cumulation of database transactions accomplishes something in the world (creates an institutional fact in each instance). So it is reasonable for an information technology professional to want to treat them all as instances of the same concept, and to expect any ontology to permit this.
Note that all the examples, including the technical database transaction, fit under the concepts in the OntoClean/DOLCE, GOL and BWW ontologies ( Figures 3, 4 and 5 respectively). These three ontologies have little if anything to say about the business aspects of the activities, concentrating on structural features and the interaction of time and state. The relevant OntoClean/DOLCE (occurrence), GOL (process situoid) and BWW (event) concepts are very much broader than the Cyc or SUMO concepts.
They also fit under the concept transaction in WordNet (Figure 6 ), if we are allowed to interpret 'group' in 'group action' as a group of agents rather than as a group of humans.
(This is in fact questionable, as WordNet has also the concept of 'causal agent' in a different branch of the ontology.) If we do accept the interpretation of 'group' as not necessarily human, then fortuitously the concept in WordNet is classified in a very abstract way, so is very similar to the OntoClean/DOLCE accomplishment, and the eventual structure constructed for the purpose from the elements of GOL.
This example has shown some of the difficulties with application-independent upper ontologies. A similar argument was made by Breuker and Winkels [16] to support a decision to refrain from using SUMO as a starting point for a series of ontologies supporting legal domains in The Netherlands. But this sort of argument is negative. It is always possible to counter such an argument with the claim that the example used is unusual, and it is always possible in principle to fix the systems examined so that the specific problem will go away.
However, the failure of SUMO and Cyc to have a mutually consistent definition of such a useful concept as transaction certainly does not support the underlying hypothesis.
The following positive argument based on how institutional fact types are created will attempt to show why on reflection we would not expect to be able to make a comprehensive ontology of institutional facts. It is intended to undermine the intuitive plausibility of the underlying hypothesis in the face of the fundamental empirical fact this paper is attempting to explain, the lack of successful applications of upper ontologies.
A new type of institutional fact is created by an agreement among a possibly small group of people, sometimes as few as one. In fact, one of the reasons institutions are created is to enable a small number of people to make these kinds of decisions in particular domains, otherwise societies would not scale. Of course, the people affected in the organization have the capability to ignore, evade or subvert a decision made by the proper authorities, so there is a sort of implicit agreement among a large number of people, but these people often do not participate in the deliberations leading to the creation of the new type of institutional fact.
For example, as a result of a sudden budgetary crisis my Head of School can unilaterally decree that henceforth the School will pay for travel to conferences only on certain complex conditions, and instruct relevant administrative staff to develop forms and information systems to record the data necessary to evaluate the conditions. We now have a new institutional fact type-travel to be funded by the School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering at The University of Queensland.
Note that it is very much easier to create a new institutional fact type than it is to introduce a new word into a natural language, even in a smallish group such as researchers in a given subdiscipline. For a proposed new word to become a part of the language it must be found useful and adopted by relatively many people, and continually used for a relatively long period of time. New words are created frequently, but most neologisms fail to be taken up.
So institutional fact types can be easily created by limited groups of people in an enormous variety of contingencies. Why would we expect weakly constrained free inventions to conform to a small number of basic categories? There are situations where this is so.
Consider the game of chess. It has a set of rules which are constitutive, in that if you do not follow the rules you are not playing chess. So long as you are playing chess, your choice of move is entirely free. The number of possible chess games is vast, but there is a well-established ontology for classifying them. There are a small number of openings (Ruy Lopez, King's Gambit, King's Indian etc.). There are a small number of end games (King and pawn versus King, Rook and King versus King etc.). There are well-established ways of evaluating middle games (relative power of forces, control of center, mobility of pieces etc.), and a small catalog of attacks (pin, discovered check, fork etc.).
A system of free creations like chess can have such an ontology because the constituting rules are fixed outside any game. We can say that the rules are transcendent with respect to the games. The opposite of transcendent is immanent. A move in a game is immanent, because it is chosen for local reasons within that game. Suppose the rules of chess were immanent; before the start of a game the players would agree on the rules for that game. It is hard to imagine a game like chess with immanent rules, but suppose one changed the number of dimensions of the chessboard. This could radically change the mobility of pieces in the middle game. Or could change the knight's move by doubling its size. That would change the evaluation of mobility of pieces and also the openings. Changing what is meant by winning would at least make great changes in the end games. Introduction of arbitrary moves and resurrection of pieces would eliminate the distinctions among opening, middle and end games. Making the rules immanent would destroy the possibility of the kinds of ontologies we have for the game with transcendent rules.
One might object that there is a core ontology that designates that there is an opening, end game etc. But allowing resurrection of pieces could lead to games without end, such as contemporary multi-user role-playing games. Think of Alice Through the Looking Glass as a prototype. In this sort of world, an additional rule change to permit a new player to take up where an exiting player left off would destroy the concept of opening. It is hard to imagine any core ontology immune to circumvention by such means.
Social institutions are immanent, not transcendent. They constrain each other, but there is no rule that cannot be changed. My Head of School can change travel policy, but cannot hire and fire as he pleases. But the university and the union can agree to change employment conditions, or they can be changed by act of Government. The European foreign exchange markets can impose constraints on governmental actions, but the introduction of a common currency can abolish the foreign exchange market. So there is no a priori transcendent system which would lead us to expect that there would be an a priori ontology for institutional facts.
We can conclude from this section that it is hard to see how ontologies created independently of applications can greatly simplify the problems of information systems interoperation/semantic web applications requiring interoperation involving institutional facts and the background needed to interpret them. This argument undermines the underlying hypothesis of the upper ontology movement, that high level concepts useful in run-time interoperation ontologies can be described with sufficient precision by a small number of concepts. That there are millions of sources for definitions of institutional facts who can work pretty well independently does not suggest that there would be substantial agreement among them.
Whether a particular application-independent ontology can work in a particular situation is a matter of empirical fact. However, a consideration on theoretical grounds is generally considered a good idea before making a commitment to a large engineering project. Our theoretical analysis is intended to show that a plausible argument exists against the utility of upper ontologies. If our analysis is sound it then falls to the proposer of a project using upper ontologies to show how the theory does not apply in the particular case.
However, when we have resolved the semantic heterogeneity among a group of applications, we generally need to represent the agreement with an ontology created for the purpose. It would be very advantageous not have to start from zero every time. The idea of having a bank of re-usable concepts is very attractive. The question becomes whether we can find aspects of the application-independent ontologies which lend themselves to re-use in the face of semantic heterogeneity. We will thus develop the second point of the paper, that structural features of the upper ontologies provide these re-usable aspects.
THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI OF KANT
Kant faced a problem something like our question as to the possibilities for application-independent upper ontology, namely what is possible to know independent of experience. He developed his proposals in the Critique of Pure Reason [17] .
There had been a long tradition of metaphysics (sketched briefly in [6] ), in which people attempted to catalog the kinds of things in the world a priori, by reasoning. There had been the recent introduction of scientific thinking whose representation in philosophy was empiricism, a major exponent of which was David Hume. In this understanding, all knowledge comes from the external world. Kant thought that on the one hand the schools of metaphysics had no way of getting agreement one among the other, nor had produced anything of use outside the particular school. On the other hand, it did not seem reasonable that nothing could be known a priori.
As shown by the choice of citation, there is some continuity between metaphysics and information systems upper ontology, at least by analogy. The analogy to empiricism is the great
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Kant divided possible knowledge into two classes: analytic and synthetic. Analytic knowledge is necessarily true. Today, analytic knowledge is generally thought to be limited to pure mathematics and pure logic. Synthetic knowledge is not necessarily true, but is contingent on how the world actually is, even though it could in principle have been different. Netscape could have won the browser war.
Synthetic knowledge is either a priori or a posteriori. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge derived from experience, for example, the results of scientific investigation. Kant's interest was in the synthetic a priori, knowledge about the world which can be known independently of experience.
Kant looked for the synthetic a priori in aspects common to all human knowledge, that is to say on how the human mind, designed as it is, constructs the representations of things in the world which are the basis of the judgments resulting in knowledge. In other words, Kant looked to the form of knowledge rather than to content.
Content of knowledge for Kant is phenomena as distinguished from noumena. Noumena is the 'thing in itself' which is only available to humans as phenomena, which are sensory representations following the laws of the synthetic a priori.
The analogy of this solution in the present problem domain is to look to ontologies which specify the form of information structures rather than the content. I argue below that three of the ontologies canvassed above are formal in this sense, namely OntoClean/DOLCE (except for the physical/nonphysical distinction), GOL and BWW. The others contain formal concepts mixed in with content-related concepts.
To give more shape to this proposed solution, we will sketch Kant's synthetic a priori and draw out more detailed analogies between it and the problems of information systems interoperability. For Kant, the synthetic a priori included space, time and what are called the categories.
First, we look at space: 'Space is the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e. the subject condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.' 3 Kant argued that all human perceptions of external reality take place in space, and that space was a human construct, the condition of representation, not an absolute reality. For information systems, human space is notoriously difficult to represent. Thus most information systems do not represent space, except in extremely rudimentary ways.
However, Kant argues that humans use space partly for identification of objects. 4 (Object in this section refers to phenomena, which are the only things that can be known.) Two otherwise indiscernible objects located in different places are different. So the concept of identity of objects is closely tied to the concept of space. Identity of objects is a crucial aspect of information systems interoperability, and must be designed into all representations. Without necessarily agreeing with Kant that space is a human construct, identification schemes for objects can be taken as an analog in the information systems world to Kant's a priori space.
Next, we look at time.
Time is the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition of our self and our inner state. 5 Time, for Kant, is essentially the possibility of either simultaneity or succession in the perception of objects. Unlike geometric space, this elementary concept of time is crucial to information systems and interoperation. A response to a message is generated after the message is received. A payment occurs after the generation of an invoice. These concepts are so deeply imbedded in information systems that they can be taken as a priori. Finally, we consider the categories. 6 Kant argues that there are four: quantity, quality, modality and relation.
Quantity includes unity, plurality and totality. Kant argues that our consciousness of a coherent organization of many parts must be constructed, so the principles of construction of an organized whole from parts must be a priori. This same claim is clearly basic to information system representations, which are constructed from fields organized into tuples organized into tables, and so on. It is also basic to institutional facts which are what the information systems are mainly about. The existence of an institutional fact is dependent on persistent representations. So the part-whole relationship can be taken as a priori, both implicit in the languages used to construct representations, and explicit in the information structures represented in the systems we build.
Quantity also includes number. Arithmetic is taken as given in information systems, so is also usefully taken as a priori.
Quality includes reality, negation and limitation. Reality produces sensation located in time. Our information systems are always about something, so there is a reality which produces the representations which the systems process and respond to. Change requires negation-a new value of a property implies the negation of the old value. Boundaries imply limitation-we have to be able to separate the objects our systems are dealing with.
The category of quality is so basic to information systems that it is hard to articulate. Negation is central to our logics and is introduced even where it does not formally applydatabase systems use negation as failure, for example. Unifying relationships which enable us to tell what parts belong to an object and which parts do not are essential to dealing with complex objects. ( [18] has a discussion of this issue as part of the OntoClean effort.)
Modality is articulated into three pairs of opposites, namely possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-contingency.
These concepts are central to contemporary formal logic, which is taken as a priori for information systems.
Relation is more complicated. For Kant it includes the following: inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and community (reciprocity between agent and patient).
Kant starts from Aristotle's view that substance is the persistence of the real in time, while accidents inhere in substance. This is essentially a statement of the entityrelationship paradigm. An entity is a substance, while accidents are the values of attributes. These concepts are central to the representations used both in information systems and more generally in logic, so can be taken as a priori for information systems interoperation.
Causality is the necessary following of objects in time, whereas dependence is necessary preceding. Physical causality is not a central issue in information systems above the hardware level, since the objects being manipulated are institutional facts, whose relationships are intentional. A sequence of institutional facts is generated by successive decisions rather than by as it were one fact bumping into another. However, information systems abound in necessary rules (integrity constraints, programmed sequences of actions), which could be taken as causal. Dependence is central to institutional facts (if X counts as Y in context C, then Y depends on both X and C). It is also central to information systems that some objects must exist in order for others to be created. Both customer and product objects must exist before an order object can be created. Both causality and dependence can be taken as a priori.
Community is the reciprocal causal relationship of substance and accident. Community has two interpretations in the Critique. One is that there can be a mutually exclusive set of possible values for an attribute (accidents), so that the presence of one excludes the others (if an order has been shipped, it is not pending). The other is that there are complex objects made up of other objects, so that the whole causes the parts and the parts the whole. Both of these interpretations are central both to institutional facts and to information systems, so can be taken as a priori.
Kant derives the categories from the faculty of judgment, which subsumes objects under concepts. An object is a representation of something in the world. Concepts generally derive from experience, but there can be a priori (pure) concepts, so that the concept of concept is itself a priori.
Furthermore, Kant often uses the term formal when describing the uses of the synthetic a priori constituents in representation of external reality. They determine the possible forms of representations.
From space-identity From time-sequence From quantity-representation structures, the part/whole relationship, arithmetic From quality-negation, unity, identity of complex objects From modality-formal logic From community-entities and attributes, dependence, causality, mutual exclusion and complex objects So by analogy from Kant's synthetic a priori, we have some plausible constituents of a formal ontology independent of material content, summarized in Figure 7 .
Kant's synthetic a priori has no special status. We have taken some aspects of it as elements of the domain of formal ontology, but there is no reason to limit ourselves to his concepts. Part of Kant's justification for distinguishing the possible structures of knowledge from the content of knowledge is that he viewed the human mind as a causal mechanism. The synthetic a priori can be seen as a sort of reverse engineered specification of the human knowing machine.
Our present theories about human cognition are much richer than Kant's. They include some universal theories, for example [19, 20] , which more or less support Kant's specification. They also include the idea that the human mind is partly shaped by the language community in which it develops. Thus there are some concepts which are common to particular, possibly quite large, language communities but which are not universal. Arithmetic and logic, in Kant's catalog, are both of this kind.
In this spirit, we would probably want to include in an upper ontology some widely used mathematical theories such as set theory, graph theory and mereology. (Mereology is the study of the part-whole relationship. See for example [21] ).
We might also want to include widely used metaphors, such as is common in human-computer interaction. For example, we might want to say that a service behaves like a bank Automatic Teller Machine.
APPLICATION TO THE ONTOLOGIES
It strikes us immediately that the GOL system (Figure 4) is very strongly analogous to Kant's system. The primitives set and ur-element are both in the category of quantity. Universal is what Kant would call a concept, and the faculty for generating, storing and using concepts is synthetic a priori. A chronoid (a time interval) is time. A topoid (a spatial region) is space. Substance and moment are from the category of relation.
The argument that GOL can be seen as a system for representing reality rather than a catalog of the contents of reality is strengthened by the observation that the main use of the elements of Figure 4 is to construct complex objects Relations are entities which glue together the things of the real world. Without relations the world would fall asunder into so many isolated pieces. This is almost exactly what Kant says about the role of the faculty of the imagination in synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction.
OntoClean/DOLCE (Figure 3 ) has also aspects related to the synthetic a priori. In particular, quality is accident which inheres in an entity (substance). Quality region (not shown in the Figure) is a concept.
Other elements of OntoClean/DOLCE have names which suggest that they are about content. However, they are typically defined by classification from values of meta-properties, so can be thought of as formal rather than material. For example, aggregate suggests the category quantity. Its subcategories amount of matter and arbitrary collection are simply whether the aggregate is mereologically invariant (change their identity if they change their parts). The class object is similarly subdivided according to meta-properties including identity, whether they have spatial location, and mereological predicates. Occurrences have a time aspect, and are also classified according to mereological predicates. The only intrusion of the material universe in the OntoClean/DOLCE system is the distinction between physical and non-physical.
So, despite the names of the lower-level classes, OntoClean/DOLCE can for the most part be viewed with GOL as a formal ontology, used to classify things in the world by their possible representations in the synthetic a priori.
The BWW ontology ( Figure 5 ) also relates closely to the synthetic a priori. Things, properties and attributes are from community; event and history from time; and type, subtype and composite thing from community. The causal concepts used in the derived structures are also from community.
The same is not true of the others. If we adopt the term material as the opposite of formal, in that material describes classes that are the (possibly generalized) content of particular applications, then we see, for example, that WordNet has many material classes. For example, consider possession. It has hyponyms asset, liability, own-right, territory and transferredproperty. All of these are linguistic terms which designate things in the world (albeit largely institutional facts). Any attempt to define them by classification from properties would have the status of a scientific theory and would not be a primary definition. Even more abstract top-level terms like entity and event can be seen as material by looking at the subclasses of which they are composed.
WordNet also contains formal terms. For example, under abstraction we find attribute, measure, relation, set, space and time. The question arises whether, because WordNet contains formal as well as material terms, it should be considered as partly material and partly formal.
This sort of question arises in the Critique. In the Introduction, Kant recognizes that the human mind is a material object, and that its parts and faculties are in the external world, so that they themselves can be known a posteriori. The a priori analysis has to do with how we know rather than what we know, so that the formal terminology can be part of a posteriori concepts as well as a priori. The latter refer to the use of the faculties to generate knowledge.
WordNet's representation and reasoning system involves navigation up and down hypernym and other hierarchies, and do not make use of the terms stored in its database. The formal terms in WordNet are therefore probably best considered as material, so that WordNet would be considered as a material ontology.
Both Cyc and SUMO also contain both material and formal terms. In contrast with WordNet, both systems use their databases as part of their reasoning systems. The formal terms are therefore used both formally and materially. They should probably be considered as mixed systems.
Now we have a classification system for upper ontologies, into formal and material. Material ontologies are about the world, while formal ontologies are about the necessary a priori formal structures in which the world appears to the information system processes which interact with it. We cannot see anything in the world without using these sorts of formal structures.
An objection will immediately be raised. Ontology researchers (e.g. [6] ) have been at pains to distinguish their work from data and knowledge representation techniques. Does the proposed distinction between formal and material ontologies not simply lump formal ontologies with knowledge representation? We need to digress into a brief look at the latter.
Computer systems interact with the world through programs. As Niklaus Wirth famously declared, a program is an algorithm plus a data structure. At the most primitive hardware level seen by programmers, the data structure of a computer is a sequence of numbered memory locations. Ultimately, whatever a computer system knows about the world is represented in groups of memory locations.
Bare memory locations are too difficult for most programmers to work with, so there has been a development of more elaborate structures to represent the data needed by the algorithms, leading to systems like slots and frames or database schemas. Note that these structures have analogies with the categories. They enable a unified representation of complex external objects, so are subject to the categories of quantity, quality and relation. If we add the algorithms used for database and logical reasoning to the kit of tools a programmer uses to write programs, we get the category of modality as well. Space, in the primitive form of identity and time in the form of sequence are also in the programming models.
Thus knowledge representation languages express limited versions of the synthetic a priori. Every program written uses these structures to represent the reality they interact with.
The problem with knowledge representation languages at this level is not that they do not provide structures relevant to the external world. It is simply that the structures they provide are much less rich than those available via the synthetic a priori to the humans doing the programming. So there has been a continuing enrichment of the capabilities of the knowledge representation systems. For example, the ERA method introduced the substance/accident and relation paradigm from the category of relations.
This sort of argument is explicitly used in the exposition of GOL by [13] . They claim that existing systems are based on set theory, and are inadequate for a number of reasons. They add to the set theoretical structures available the additional structure of universal, which is not a set. Similarly, the OntoClean/DOLCE effort is based primarily on incorporating mereological concepts into what we might call the knowledge representation a priori. Efforts have been made to incorporate other rich structures into knowledge representation-for example [22] present a case for the utility of category theory.
What we are seeing therefore is a steady increase in the richness and sophistication of the knowledge systems a priori, the tools and structures the programmer uses to make the information systems see the world they interact with. We can compare this with the enormously powerful tools physicists use to see the world of physical objects, through for example [23] . A tsunami is not a partial differential equation, even though the scientists studying it might use partial differential equations to represent it in their theories.
So yes, the present analysis lumps formal ontologies with knowledge representation systems, and argues that there are deep reasons why this should be so.
SO WHAT?
The central question for this paper is what use can be made of the distinction proposed between formal and material ontologies. We began with the problem of achieving interoperability among information systems (the semantic web), which is bedeviled by semantic heterogeneity. Because the content of the kinds of information systems we are interested in consists almost exclusively of records of institutional facts, and institutional facts are not only enormously variable but require rich background to interpret, we cast doubt on the ability of general purpose ontologies to be able to be of much use in the development of specialized ontologies for particular application domains.
Our analysis shows that the problem is mostly because of the material aspects of the general purpose ontologies, since the material ontologies specify content. Formal ontologies specify only form, so are neutral with respect to content. This means that they perform a more limited task than material ontologies.
We have seen above that in the federated database literature, there are two types of semantic heterogeneity which correspond to the distinction between formal and material ontologies (see [5] for a detailed discussion of this point). Corresponding to formal ontologies is resolvable semantic heterogeneity, involving structural differences which can be resolved using more or less complex views. The more pervasive and difficult type such as illustrated in the examples in the present work is called fundamental semantic heterogeneity. This corresponds to material ontologies.
Formal ontologies address issues in resolvable heterogeneity, by providing what amount to rich abstract data types supporting powerful reasoning engines. They assist in the development of application-specific ontologies by enabling the content to be represented in these rich types, permitting the reasoning engines to work within and between interoperating applications. The material content is the responsibility of the developers of the system within their particular context. The reported successes of OntoClean, for example, are of this kind. Guarino and Welty [24] give an overview, whereas a complex natural language domain is analysed in [25] and WordNet in [12, 26] . The second includes the DOLCE extensions. This is not to suggest that material ontologies cannot be more or less general. It would probably be useful to have a representation of the European Union (EU) intellectual property laws and regulations as a general context for developing specific ontologies involving exchange of music videos or computer software within the EU. This is because the system of institutional facts constituting the EU intellectual property law is transcendent with respect to intellectual property exchange within the EU. That more general ontology would not apply to exchanges operating within the United States or India. Similarly [16] presents a high level (core) ontology as a starting point for several ontologies supporting laws and regulations in The Netherlands, but it is unlikely that it would well support an ontology of Australian Aboriginal traditional law, which includes concepts like collective responsibility, where, for example, punishment of a cousin can atone for a transgression, and in fact the authors make no claim to such generality. The argument of this paper is that material ontologies which are not transcendent to any application domain are unlikely to be useful in facilitating interoperation of information systems.
IMPLICATIONS FOR REASONING WITH ONTOLOGIES
Ontologies are put together using a number of structural relationships, the most important of which is subsumption, or the is-a-relationship, which gives a progressively more specific decomposition of the most general terms. The semantics of subsumption is based on the subtype relationship. The general idea is that an ontology will describe some very general classes of things that exist in the world, then subdivide these general classes perhaps to many levels to get the most specific classes of things. For example, the Linnean system used to classify biological organisms consists of millions of most specific classes (species), but has but two most general classes for macroscopic organisms, the kingdoms animal and vegetable. If we take the view that the formal ontologies are like Kant's synthetic a priori, so cannot describe external reality, then they do not represent the most general classes of things in the world. Just as a tsunami is not a partial differential equation, the bill of materials for an aircraft is not a part/whole relationship system. This claim would be obvious except that object-oriented programming systems often organize their data structures using subsumption from very abstract most general classes. Systems such as UML generally store the basic data structures and methods for a construct like class in an object called, for example, class. Particular classes in a given design are represented as instances of class in order to inherit the data structures and methods. But class does not have the semantics of everything, rather of nothing. What the engineer does by instantiating a class is to introduce some semantics. Guarino and Welty [24] argue on logical grounds that instantiation is not subsumption, even within the semantics of a given material ontology.
Our earlier sketch of the development of knowledge representation languages from computer architectures allows us an analogy which may bring the point home. A memory location in a computer together with the computer's instruction set can be seen as similarly a most general class. But we do not think of the unassigned memory location as containing every number, but no number.
Therefore, the argument is that a material ontology is a representation of what is in the world, constructed as a subsumption structure, whereas a formal ontology is a rich knowledge representation system also constructed in large part using a subsumption structure. But the two are independent. A material world can be represented in many ways and a particular knowledge representation structure can represent many material worlds.
Mixed systems such as Cyc or DOLCE become problematic, since they include both material and formal classes in the same subsumption structure. This leads to confusion, and as we will see below can lead to significant deficiencies in the ontology.
What we want is to be able to represent an ontology using clearly separated material and formal subsumption structures. A mechanism for doing this comes from methods for constructing classification systems in the information science community, where the classification system can be represented using the method of facets [27, 28] . This method can be illustrated by reference to the menu of an oriental noodle restaurant, where there might be three taxonomies: type of noodle (Hokkien, Singapore etc.); sauce (Chinese, Japanese, Thai etc.); and main ingredient (beef, pork etc.). A single dish is characterized by a choice from these three taxonomies. The menu could be represented as a single taxonomy, where each noodle type has a subclass for each sauce, and further each sauce subclass of each noodle type has a subclass for each main ingredient. But representation in a single hierarchy obscures the underlying symmetry, making the system more difficult to use and to modify. It is generally more convenient to represent each of the taxonomies as a separate facet, and to classify each dish by three choices, one from each. Many major classification systems are built this way. SNOMED, used for classifying medical records, has 11 more or less orthogonal facets each of which has many thousands of classes.
The mechanism and benefit of faceted classification structures is relatively easy to see from the OntoClean/DOLCE ontology in Figure 3 . Recall that this ontology is mixed because the material distinctions physical/non-physical and their subtypes are distinguished from the other elements in the taxonomy, which are formal. If the formal ontology is neutral with respect to content, then the physical/nonphysical taxonomy should appear as subclasses everywhere in the taxonomy. Besides physical and non-physical objects (e.g. person versus corporation) and qualities (e.g. weight versus name) there should be physical/ mental occurrences (e.g. hurricane versus sale).
In other words, the orthogonality of the formal and material sub-ontologies should be reflected in a symmetry of the taxonomy-every formal class should have physical and nonphysical subclasses. Figure 8 shows the OntoClean/DOLCE system of Figure 3 represented in two facets, formal and material. The material facet consists of two classes only, whereas the formal facet is the taxonomy of Figure 3 with the material classes physical and non-physical factored out. Note that this factoring is minimal. A thorough re-thinking of the DOLCE upper ontology on the faceted principle could be substantially different. For example, the abstract class might be merged in with the others.
A particular thing in an ontology would be represented by a choice from both facets. For example, a hurricane is a [material object: physical, form: process] whereas a memory is a [material object: non-physical, form: object] and weight is a [material object: physical, form: quality]. The larger mixed ontologies such as Cyc or SUMO could possibly be represented in a faceted manner, thereby separating their formal and material aspects.
Taken together with our earlier argument that formal ontologies are better thought of as rich knowledge representation languages, this faceted approach to mixed ontologies makes the formal ontologies look much like types as they appear in programming languages.
The formal ontologies are essentially abstract data types, and as such support integrity checks and reasoning systems. There is no space for a comprehensive catalog of such mechanisms, but we can present some examples. In the DOLCE system there is a distinction between an endurant and perdurant. An endurant is timeless (sort of a noun), whereas a perdurant exists in time (sort of a verb). Every endurant must have perdurants to create and destroy it. Every perdurant must relate to at least one endurant. Using this formal structure therefore gives a completeness check on the material ontology which is independent of material ontologies and can be automated in the software provided with the ontology server in which the ontology is created and maintained. Furthermore, the subsumption and mereological relationships are formal and independent of material ontology, so allow inferences which can be implemented in the reasoning software supporting the ontology server.
CONCLUSIONS
The main claim of this paper is that the basic empirical fact, that upper ontologies have not led to successful applications, leads to an attempt to undermine the underlying hypothesis that useful high-level constructs can be described simply, by looking more closely at the sources of semantic heterogeneity. The possibility of an a priori ontology depends on there being strong external determiners on the content of the system. Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that a transcendent ontology is possible.
However, following the analogy of Kant's synthetic a priori there is strong support for the feasibility of applicationindependent formal ontologies, which specify not what there is in the world but how what there is in the world can appear to humans or information systems. We thus have a distinction among application-independent ontologies: formal, which are feasible, and material, which are not.
A practical consequence of this distinction is that when a formal ontology is used to construct a material ontology for a particular class of application, the concepts in the formal ontology should not be represented as material classes in the ontology. Mixed ontologies should be factored into formal and material facets.
Finally, we would not expect that the formal ontologies would help in resolving semantic heterogeneity. Once agreement has been reached on the material ontology, a formal ontology has value as a library of richly structured and well-understood abstract data types and structural organizational principles, which make the technical aspects of ontology construction easier and more reliable.
